

Security Assessment T.I.M.E. Dividend (TIME) -BNB Smart Chain (BSC)

CertiK Verified on Mar 24th, 2023



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T.I.M.E. Dividend (TIME) - BNB Smart Chain (BSC)

The security assessment was prepared by CertiK, the leader in Web3.0 security.

Executive Summary

TYPES DeFi	ECOSYSTEM Binance Smart Chain (BSC)	METHODS Formal Verification, Manual Review, Static Analysis
LANGUAGE Solidity	TIMELINE Delivered on 03/24/2023	KEY COMPONENTS N/A
CODEBASE https://bitbucket.org/internet-money/ contracts/src/master/contracts/TIME View All		COMMITS 856179395047c7818b0b34ddae503089ba0c2969 View All

Vulnerability Summary

3	3	0	0	0	0	0
Total Findings	Resolved	Mitigated	Partially Resolved	Acknowledged	Declined	Unresolved
0 Critical				Critical risks are those t a platform and must be should not invest in any risks.	addressed before	launch. Users
1 Major	1 Resolved			Major risks can include errors. Under specific c can lead to loss of fund	ircumstances, the	se major risks
1 Medium	1 Resolved			Medium risks may not p but they can affect the o		
1 Minor	1 Resolved			Minor risks can be any scale. They generally d integrity of the project, f other solutions.	o not compromise	the overall
0 Informational				Informational errors are improve the style of the within industry best pra the overall functioning o	code or certain op ctices. They usuall	perations to fall

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CODEBASE T.I.M.E. DIVIDEND (TIME) - BNB SMART CHAIN (BSC)

Repository

https://bitbucket.org/internet-money/wallet-contracts/src/master/contracts/TIMEDividend.sol

Commit

856179395047c7818b0b34ddae503089ba0c2969

AUDIT SCOPE T.I.M.E. DIVIDEND (TIME) - BNB SMART CHAIN (BSC)

1 file audited • 1 file with Resolved findings

ID	File	SHA256 Checksum
• TIM	projects/Internet-money/wallet-contracts/contracts/TI MEDividend.sol	bb0400ff9b904a7de218ab0039e6eb169d1d1 8e72d485eecc8b7dda25b07f52a

APPROACH & METHODS

T.I.M.E. DIVIDEND (TIME) - BNB SMART CHAIN (BSC)

This report has been prepared for Internet Money to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the T.I.M.E. Dividend (TIME) - BNB Smart Chain (BSC) project as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Formal Verification, Manual Review, and Static Analysis techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational. We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices. We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors;
- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes;
- · Add enough unit tests to cover the possible use cases;
- Provide more comments per each function for readability, especially contracts that are verified in public;
- Provide more transparency on privileged activities once the protocol is live.

FINDINGS T.I.M.E. DIVIDEND (TIME) - BNB SMART CHAIN (BSC)

3	0	1	1	1	0
Total Findings	Critical	Major	Medium	Minor	Informational

This report has been prepared to discover issues and vulnerabilities for T.I.M.E. Dividend (TIME) - BNB Smart Chain (BSC). Through this audit, we have uncovered 3 issues ranging from different severity levels. Utilizing the techniques of Formal Verification, Manual Review & Static Analysis to complement rigorous manual code reviews, we discovered the following findings:

ID	Title	Category	Severity	Status
TIM-01	Initial Token Distribution	Centralization / Privilege	Major	Resolved
TIM-02	Function Calls User-Provided Addresses With No Access Control Modifier	Logical Issue	Medium	Resolved
TIM-03	Unsafe Integer Cast	Logical Issue	Minor	Resolved

TIM-01 INITIAL TOKEN DISTRIBUTION

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Centralization / Privilege	Major	projects/Internet-money/wallet-contracts/contracts/TIME Dividend.sol: 43~48	Resolved

Description

All T.I.M.E. Dividend tokens are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is a potential centralization risk as the deployer can distribute those tokens without the consensus of the community.

Recommendation

We recommend transparency through providing a breakdown of the intended initial token distribution in a public location. We also recommend the team make an effort to restrict the access of the corresponding private key.

Alleviation


The breakdown of the initial token distribution is available at https://bscscan.com/token/tokenholderchart/0x8734022D0fdBF1faeCE14cE077Edfcb936543E25.

TIM-02FUNCTION CALLS USER-PROVIDED ADDRESSES WITH NO
ACCESS CONTROL MODIFIER

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	Medium	projects/Internet-money/wallet-contracts/contracts/TIMEDividend.sol: 162	Resolved

Description

Calling a user provided address is dangerous, especially in a public function with no access control restriction. An attacker could deploy a malicious contract and use the vulnerable function to trigger a call to the malicious contract, potentially stealing user funds or causing other serious damages.



Recommendation

We recommend implementing proper sanity checks on the function argument address internetMoneySwapRouter to make sure this function will only perform external calls to the verified internetMoneySwapRouter contract.

Alleviation

Internet Money team:

We have resolved to remove this function and simply find other means for efficient token collection.

Changes have been reflected in this commit.

TIM-03 UNSAFE INTEGER CAST

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Logical Issue	 Minor 	projects/Internet-money/wallet-contracts/contracts/TIMEDividend.sol: 8 4, 134	Resolved

Description

84	<pre>int256 correctionDelta = int256(magnifiedDividendPerShare * amount);</pre>
The type value's si	e conversion [int256(magnifiedDividendPerShare * amount)] from type uint256 to type int256 may flip the sign.
134 correction	<pre>uint256 product = uint256(int256(magDividendPerShare * balance) +);</pre>
The type	conversion int256(magDividendPerShare * balance) from type uint256 to type int256 may flip the

• The type conversion int256(magDividendPerShare * balance) from type uint256 to type int256 may flip the value's sign.

Recommendation

We advise checking the bounds of integer values before casting, so the values will not flip the sign. Alternatively, the SafeCast library from OpenZeppelin can be used in place of type casting.

Reference: <u>https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-</u> contracts/blob/71aaca2d9db465560213740392044b2cd3853a3b/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol

Alleviation

The team heeded our advice and fixed the issue in this commit.

FORMAL VERIFICATION

T.I.M.E. DIVIDEND (TIME) - BNB SMART CHAIN (BSC)

Formal guarantees about the behavior of smart contracts can be obtained by reasoning about properties relating to the entire contract (e.g. contract invariants) or to specific functions of the contract. Once such properties are proven to be valid, they guarantee that the contract behaves as specified by the property. As part of this audit, we applied automated formal verification (symbolic model checking) to prove that well-known functions in the smart contracts adhere to their expected behavior.

Considered Functions And Scope

In the following, we provide a description of the properties that have been used in this audit. They are grouped according to the type of contract they apply to.

Verification of ERC-20 Compliance

We verified properties of the public interface of those token contracts that implement the ERC-20 interface. This covers

- Functions transfer and transferFrom that are widely used for token transfers,
- functions approve and allowance that enable the owner of an account to delegate a certain subset of her tokens to another account (i.e. to grant an allowance), and
- the functions balanceOf and totalSupply, which are verified to correctly reflect the internal state of the contract.

The properties that were considered within the scope of this audit are as follows:

Property Name	Title
erc20-transfer-revert-zero	transfer Prevents Transfers to the Zero Address
erc20-transfer-succeed-normal	transfer Succeeds on Admissible Non-self Transfers
erc20-transfer-correct-amount	transfer Transfers the Correct Amount in Non-self Transfers
erc20-transfer-correct-amount-self	transfer Transfers the Correct Amount in Self Transfers
erc20-transfer-succeed-self	transfer Succeeds on Admissible Self Transfers
erc20-transfer-exceed-balance	transfer Fails if Requested Amount Exceeds Available Balance
erc20-transfer-false	If transfer Returns false, the Contract State Is Not Changed
erc20-transfer-never-return-false	transfer Never Returns false
erc20-transferfrom-revert-from-zero	transferFrom Fails for Transfers From the Zero Address

Property Name	Title
erc20-transfer-change-state	transfer Has No Unexpected State Changes
erc20-transferfrom-revert-to-zero	transferFrom Fails for Transfers To the Zero Address
erc20-transfer-recipient-overflow	transfer Prevents Overflows in the Recipient's Balance
erc20-transferfrom-succeed-normal	transferFrom Succeeds on Admissible Non-self Transfers
erc20-transferfrom-correct-amount	transferFrom Transfers the Correct Amount in Non-self Transfers
erc20-transferfrom-succeed-self	transferFrom Succeeds on Admissible Self Transfers
erc20-transferfrom-correct-amount-self	transferFrom Performs Self Transfers Correctly
erc20-transferfrom-fail-exceed-balance	transferFrom Fails if the Requested Amount Exceeds the Available Balance
erc20-transferfrom-correct-allowance	transferFrom Updated the Allowance Correctly
erc20-transferfrom-fail-exceed-allowance	transferFrom Fails if the Requested Amount Exceeds the Available Allowance
erc20-transferfrom-false	If transferFrom Returns false, the Contract's State Is Unchanged
erc20-transferfrom-never-return-false	transferFrom Never Returns false
erc20-totalsupply-succeed-always	totalSupply Always Succeeds
erc20-totalsupply-correct-value	totalSupply Returns the Value of the Corresponding State Variable
erc20-totalsupply-change-state	totalSupply Does Not Change the Contract's State
erc20-balanceof-succeed-always	balanceOf Always Succeeds
erc20-transferfrom-change-state	transferFrom Has No Unexpected State Changes
erc20-transferfrom-fail-recipient-overflow	transferFrom Prevents Overflows in the Recipient's Balance
erc20-balanceof-correct-value	balanceOf Returns the Correct Value
erc20-allowance-succeed-always	allowance Always Succeeds
erc20-balanceof-change-state	balanceOf Does Not Change the Contract's State
erc20-allowance-correct-value	allowance Returns Correct Value

Property Name	Title
erc20-allowance-change-state	allowance Does Not Change the Contract's State
erc20-approve-succeed-normal	approve Succeeds for Admissible Inputs
erc20-approve-revert-zero	approve Prevents Approvals For the Zero Address
erc20-approve-correct-amount	approve Updates the Approval Mapping Correctly
erc20-approve-change-state	approve Has No Unexpected State Changes
erc20-approve-false	If approve Returns false, the Contract's State Is Unchanged
erc20-approve-never-return-false	approve Never Returns false

Verification Results

In the remainder of this section, we list all contracts where model checking of at least one property was not successful. There are several reasons why this could happen:

- Model checking reports a counterexample that violates the property. Depending on the counterexample, this occurs if
 - The specification of the property is too generic and does not accurately capture the intended behavior of the smart contract. In that case, the counterexample does not indicate a problem in the underlying smart contract. We report such instances as being "inapplicable".
 - The property is applicable to the smart contract. In that case, the counterexample showcases a problem in the smart contract and a correspond finding is reported separately in the Findings section of this report. In the following tables, we report such instances as "invalid". The distinction between spurious and actual counterexamples is done manually by the auditors.
- The model checking result is inconclusive. Such a result does not indicate a problem in the underlying smart contract. An inconclusive result may occur if
 - The model checking engine fails to construct a proof. This can happen if the logical deductions necessary are beyond the capabilities of the automated reasoning tool. It is a technical limitation of all proof engines and cannot be avoided in general.
 - The model checking engine runs out of time or memory and did not produce a result. This can happen if automatic abstraction techniques are ineffective or of the state space is too big.

Detailed Results For Contract TIMEDividend (projects/Internet-money/walletcontracts/contracts/TIMEDividend.sol) In Commit 6eac37e4364caa65f0bd743fe70a399950778cbe

Verification of ERC-20 Compliance

Detailed results for function transfer

Property Name	Final Result	Remarks
erc20-transfer-revert-zero	• True	
erc20-transfer-succeed-normal	Inapplicable	The specification does not reflect the contract's intended behavior.
erc20-transfer-correct-amount	• True	
erc20-transfer-correct-amount-self	• True	
erc20-transfer-succeed-self	Inapplicable	The specification does not reflect the contract's intended behavior.
erc20-transfer-exceed-balance	• True	
erc20-transfer-false	• True	
erc20-transfer-never-return-false	• True	
erc20-transfer-change-state	 Inapplicable 	The specification does not reflect the contract's intended behavior.
erc20-transfer-recipient-overflow	• True	

Detailed results for function transferFrom

Property Name	Final Result	Remarks
erc20-transferfrom-revert-from-zero	• True	
erc20-transferfrom-revert-to-zero	• True	
erc20-transferfrom-succeed-normal	Inapplicable	The specification does not reflect the contract's intended behavior.
erc20-transferfrom-correct-amount	• True	
erc20-transferfrom-succeed-self	Inapplicable	The specification does not reflect the contract's intended behavior.
erc20-transferfrom-correct-amount-self	• True	
erc20-transferfrom-fail-exceed-balance	• True	
erc20-transferfrom-correct-allowance	• True	
erc20-transferfrom-fail-exceed-allowance	• True	
erc20-transferfrom-false	• True	
erc20-transferfrom-never-return-false	• True	
erc20-transferfrom-change-state	Inapplicable	The specification does not reflect the contract's intended behavior.
erc20-transferfrom-fail-recipient-overflow	• True	

Detailed results for function totalSupply

Property Name	Final Result Remarks	
erc20-totalsupply-succeed-always	• True	
erc20-totalsupply-correct-value	• True	
erc20-totalsupply-change-state	• True	

Detailed results for function balance0f

Property Name	Final Result	Remarks
erc20-balanceof-succeed-always	• True	
erc20-balanceof-correct-value	• True	
erc20-balanceof-change-state	• True	

Detailed results for function allowance

Property Name	Final Result Remarks	
erc20-allowance-succeed-always	• True	
erc20-allowance-correct-value	• True	
erc20-allowance-change-state	• True	

Detailed results for function approve

Property Name	Final Result Remarks
erc20-approve-succeed-normal	• True
erc20-approve-revert-zero	• True
erc20-approve-correct-amount	• True
erc20-approve-change-state	• True
erc20-approve-false	• True
erc20-approve-never-return-false	• True

APPENDIX T.I.M.E. DIVIDEND (TIME) - BNB SMART CHAIN (BSC)

Finding Categories

Categories	Description
Centralization / Privilege	Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that act against the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles in combination with a mechanism to relocate funds.
Logical Issue	Logical Issue findings detail a fault in the logic of the linked code, such as an incorrect notion on how block.timestamp works.

Checksum Calculation Method

The "Checksum" field in the "Audit Scope" section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.

The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux "sha256sum" command against the target file.

Details on Formal Verification

Some Solidity smart contracts from this project have been formally verified using symbolic model checking. Each such contract was compiled into a mathematical model which reflects all its possible behaviors with respect to the property. The model takes into account the semantics of the Solidity instructions found in the contract. All verification results that we report are based on that model.

Technical Description

The model also formalizes a simplified execution environment of the Ethereum blockchain and a verification harness that performs the initialization of the contract and all possible interactions with the contract. Initially, the contract state is initialized non-deterministically (i.e. by arbitrary values) and over-approximates the reachable state space of the contract throughout any actual deployment on chain. All valid results thus carry over to the contract's behavior in arbitrary states after it has been deployed.

Assumptions and Simplifications

The following assumptions and simplifications apply to our model:

- Gas consumption is not taken into account, i.e. we assume that executions do not terminate prematurely because they run out of gas.
- The contract's state variables are non-deterministically initialized before invocation of any function. That ignores contract invariants and may lead to false positives. It is, however, a safe over-approximation.

- The verification engine reasons about unbounded integers. Machine arithmetic is modeled using modular arithmetic based on the bit-width of the underlying numeric Solidity type. This ensures that over- and underflow characteristics are faithfully represented.
- Certain low-level calls and inline assembly are not supported and may lead to a contract not being formally verified.
- We model the semantics of the Solidity source code and not the semantics of the EVM bytecode in a compiled contract.

Formalism for Property Specification

All properties are expressed in linear temporal logic (LTL). For that matter, we treat each invocation of and each return from a public or an external function as a discrete time step. Our analysis reasons about the contract's state upon entering and upon leaving public or external functions.

Apart from the Boolean connectives and the modal operators "always" (written []) and "eventually" (written), we use the following predicates as atomic propositions. They are evaluated on the contract's state whenever a discrete time step occurs:

- started(f, [cond]) Indicates an invocation of contract function f within a state satisfying formula cond.
- willSucceed(f, [cond]) Indicates an invocation of contract function f within a state satisfying formula cond and considers only those executions that do not revert.
- finished(f, [cond]) Indicates that execution returns from contract function f in a state satisfying formula cond. Here, formula cond may refer to the contract's state variables and to the value they had upon entering the function (using the old function).
- reverted(f, [cond]) Indicates that execution of contract function f was interrupted by an exception in a contract state satisfying formula cond.

The verification performed in this audit operates on a harness that non-deterministically invokes a function of the contract's public or external interface. All formulas are analyzed w.r.t. the trace that corresponds to this function invocation.

Description of the Analyzed ERC-20 Properties

The specifications are designed such that they capture the desired and admissible behaviors of the ERC-20 functions transfer, transferFrom, approve, allowance, balanceOf, and totalSupply. In the following, we list those property specifications.

Properties related to function transfer

erc20-transfer-revert-zero

transfer Prevents Transfers to the Zero Address. Any call of the form transfer(recipient, amount) must fail if the recipient address is the zero address. Specification:

```
[](started(contract.transfer(to, value), to == address(0)) ==>
  <>(reverted(contract.transfer) || finished(contract.transfer(to, value), return
      == false)))
```

erc20-transfer-succeed-normal

transfer Succeeds on Admissible Non-self Transfers. All invocations of the form transfer(recipient, amount) must succeed and return true if

- the recipient address is not the zero address,
- amount does not exceed the balance of address msg.sender ,
- transferring amount to the recipient address does not lead to an overflow of the recipient's balance, and
- the supplied gas suffices to complete the call. Specification:

erc20-transfer-succeed-self

transfer Succeeds on Admissible Self Transfers. All self-transfers, i.e. invocations of the form transfer(recipient, amount) where the recipient address equals the address in msg.sender must succeed and return true if

- the value in amount does not exceed the balance of msg.sender and
- the supplied gas suffices to complete the call. Specification:

erc20-transfer-correct-amount

transfer Transfers the Correct Amount in Non-self Transfers. All non-reverting invocations of transfer(recipient, amount) that return true must subtract the value in amount from the balance of msg.sender and add the same value to the balance of the recipient address. Specification:

erc20-transfer-correct-amount-self

transfer Transfers the Correct Amount in Self Transfers. All non-reverting invocations of transfer(recipient, amount) that return true and where the recipient address equals msg.sender (i.e. self-transfers) must not change the balance of address msg.sender. Specification:

erc20-transfer-change-state

transfer Has No Unexpected State Changes. All non-reverting invocations of transfer(recipient, amount) that return true must only modify the balance entries of the msg.sender and the recipient addresses. Specification:

```
[](willSucceed(contract.transfer(to, value), p1 != msg.sender && p1 != to) ==>
   <>(finished(contract.transfer(to, value), return == true ==> (_totalSupply ==
        old(_totalSupply) && _allowances == old(_allowances) && _balances[p1] ==
        old(_balances[p1]) && other_state_variables ==
        old(other_state_variables)))))
```

erc20-transfer-exceed-balance

transfer Fails if Requested Amount Exceeds Available Balance. Any transfer of an amount of tokens that exceeds the balance of msg.sender must fail. Specification:

transfer Prevents Overflows in the Recipient's Balance. Any invocation of transfer(recipient, amount) must fail if it causes the balance of the recipient address to overflow. Specification:

erc20-transfer-false

If transfer Returns false, the Contract State Is Not Changed. If the transfer function in contract contract fails by returning false, it must undo all state changes it incurred before returning to the caller. Specification:

[](willSucceed(contract.transfer(to, value)) ==> <>(finished(contract.transfer(to, value), return == false ==> (_balances == old(_balances) && _totalSupply == old(_totalSupply) && _allowances == old(_allowances) && other_state_variables == old(other_state_variables)))))

erc20-transfer-never-return-false

transfer Never Returns false. The transfer function must never return false to signal a failure. Specification:

[](!(finished(contract.transfer, return == false)))

Properties related to function transferFrom

erc20-transferfrom-revert-from-zero

transferFrom Fails for Transfers From the Zero Address. All calls of the form transferFrom(from, dest, amount) where the from address is zero, must fail. Specification:

```
[](started(contract.transferFrom(from, to, value), from == address(0)) ==>
    <>(reverted(contract.transferFrom) || finished(contract.transferFrom, return ==
    false)))
```

erc20-transferfrom-revert-to-zero

transferFrom Fails for Transfers To the Zero Address. All calls of the form transferFrom(from, dest, amount) where the dest address is zero, must fail. Specification:

[](started(contract.transferFrom(from, to, value), to == address(0)) ==>
 <>(reverted(contract.transferFrom) || finished(contract.transferFrom, return ==
 false)))

erc20-transferfrom-succeed-normal

transferFrom Succeeds on Admissible Non-self Transfers. All invocations of transferFrom(from, dest, amount) must succeed and return true if

- the value of amount does not exceed the balance of address from ,
- the value of amount does not exceed the allowance of msg.sender for address from,
- transferring a value of amount to the address in dest does not lead to an overflow of the recipient's balance, and
- the supplied gas suffices to complete the call. Specification:

erc20-transferfrom-succeed-self

transferFrom Succeeds on Admissible Self Transfers. All invocations of transferFrom(from, dest, amount) where the dest address equals the from address (i.e. self-transfers) must succeed and return true if:

- The value of amount does not exceed the balance of address from ,
- the value of amount does not exceed the allowance of msg.sender for address from , and
- the supplied gas suffices to complete the call. Specification:

[](started(contract.transferFrom(from, to, value), from != address(0) && from == to && value <= _balances[from] && value <= _allowances[from][msg.sender] && value >= 0 && _balances[from] <</pre>

_allowances[from][msg.sender] <

<>(finished(contract.transferFrom(from, to, value), return == true)))

transferFrom Transfers the Correct Amount in Non-self Transfers. All invocations of transferFrom(from, dest, amount) that succeed and that return true subtract the value in amount from the balance of address from and add the same value to the balance of address dest. Specification:

erc20-transferfrom-correct-amount-self

transferFrom Performs Self Transfers Correctly. All non-reverting invocations of transferFrom(from, dest, amount) that return true and where the address in from equals the address in dest (i.e. self-transfers) do not change the balance entry of the from address (which equals dest). Specification:

erc20-transferfrom-correct-allowance

transferFrom Updated the Allowance Correctly. All non-reverting invocations of transferFrom(from, dest, amount) that return true must decrease the allowance for address msg.sender over address from by the value in amount. Specification:

erc20-transferfrom-change-state

transferFrom Has No Unexpected State Changes. All non-reverting invocations of transferFrom(from, dest, amount) that return true may only modify the following state variables:

- The balance entry for the address in dest ,
- The balance entry for the address in from,
- The allowance for the address in msg.sender for the address in from . Specification:

```
[](willSucceed(contract.transferFrom(from, to, amount), p1 != from && p1 != to &&
    (p2 != from || p3 != msg.sender)) ==> <>(finished(contract.transferFrom(from,
    to, amount), return == true ==> (_totalSupply == old(_totalSupply) &&
    _balances[p1] == old(_balances[p1]) && _allowances[p2][p3] ==
    old(_allowances[p2][p3]) && other_state_variables ==
    old(other_state_variables)))))
```

erc20-transferfrom-fail-exceed-balance

```
transferFrom Fails if the Requested Amount Exceeds the Available Balance. Any call of the form transferFrom(from, dest, amount) with a value for amount that exceeds the balance of address from must fail. Specification:
```

<>(reverted(contract.transferFrom) || finished(contract.transferFrom, return == false)))

erc20-transferfrom-fail-exceed-allowance

transferFrom Fails if the Requested Amount Exceeds the Available Allowance. Any call of the form transferFrom(from, dest, amount) with a value for amount that exceeds the allowance of address msg.sender must fail. Specification:

erc20-transferfrom-fail-recipient-overflow

transferFrom Prevents Overflows in the Recipient's Balance. Any call of transferFrom(from, dest, amount) with a value in amount whose transfer would cause an overflow of the balance of address dest must fail. Specification:

erc20-transferfrom-false

If transferFrom Returns false, the Contract's State Is Unchanged. If transferFrom returns false to signal a failure, it must undo all incurred state changes before returning to the caller. Specification:

```
[](willSucceed(contract.transferFrom(from, to, value)) ==>
  <>(finished(contract.transferFrom(from, to, value), return == false ==>
  (_balances == old(_balances) && _totalSupply == old(_totalSupply) &&
  _allowances == old(_allowances) && other_state_variables ==
    old(other_state_variables)))))
```

erc20-transferfrom-never-return-false

```
transferFrom Never Returns false. The transferFrom function must never return false. Specification:
```

[](!(finished(contract.transferFrom, return == false)))

Properties related to function totalSupply

erc20-totalsupply-succeed-always

totalsupply Always Succeeds. The function totalsupply must always succeeds, assuming that its execution does not run out of gas. Specification:

[](started(contract.totalSupply) ==> <>(finished(contract.totalSupply)))

erc20-totalsupply-correct-value

totalSupply Returns the Value of the Corresponding State Variable. The totalSupply function must return the value that is held in the corresponding state variable of contract contract. Specification:

totalSupply Does Not Change the Contract's State. The totalSupply function in contract contract must not change any state variables. Specification:

```
[](willSucceed(contract.totalSupply) ==> <>(finished(contract.totalSupply,
    _totalSupply == old(_totalSupply) && _balances == old(_balances) &&
    _allowances == old(_allowances) && other_state_variables ==
    old(other_state_variables))))
```

Properties related to function balance0f

erc20-balanceof-succeed-always

balanceof Always Succeeds. Function balanceof must always succeed if it does not run out of gas. Specification:

[](started(contract.balanceOf) ==> <>(finished(contract.balanceOf)))

erc20-balanceof-correct-value

balanceOf Returns the Correct Value. Invocations of balanceOf(owner) must return the value that is held in the contract's balance mapping for address owner. Specification:

```
[](willSucceed(contract.balanceOf) ==> <>(finished(contract.balanceOf(owner),
      return == _balances[owner])))
```

erc20-balanceof-change-state

balanceOf Does Not Change the Contract's State. Function balanceOf must not change any of the contract's state variables. Specification:

```
[](willSucceed(contract.balanceOf) ==> <>(finished(contract.balanceOf(owner),
    _totalSupply == old(_totalSupply) && _balances == old(_balances) &&
    _allowances == old(_allowances) && other_state_variables ==
    old(other_state_variables))))
```

Properties related to function allowance

erc20-allowance-succeed-always

allowance Always Succeeds. Function allowance must always succeed, assuming that its execution does not run out of gas. Specification:

[](started(contract.allowance) ==> <>(finished(contract.allowance)))

allowance Returns Correct Value. Invocations of allowance(owner, spender) must return the allowance that address spender has over tokens held by address owner. Specification:

```
[](willSucceed(contract.allowance(owner, spender)) ==>
    <>(finished(contract.allowance(owner, spender), return ==
        _allowances[owner][spender])))
```

erc20-allowance-change-state

allowance Does Not Change the Contract's State. Function allowance must not change any of the contract's state variables. Specification:

```
[](willSucceed(contract.allowance(owner, spender)) ==>
    <>(finished(contract.allowance(owner, spender), _totalSupply == old(_totalSupply)
    && _balances == old(_balances) && _allowances == old(_allowances) &&
    other_state_variables == old(other_state_variables))))
```

Properties related to function approve

erc20-approve-revert-zero

approve Prevents Approvals For the Zero Address. All calls of the form approve(spender, amount) must fail if the address in spender is the zero address. Specification:

```
[](started(contract.approve(spender, value), spender == address(0)) ==>
  <>(reverted(contract.approve) || finished(contract.approve(spender, value),
    return == false)))
```

erc20-approve-succeed-normal

approve Succeeds for Admissible Inputs. All calls of the form approve (spender, amount) must succeed, if

- the address in spender is not the zero address and
- the execution does not run out of gas. Specification:

```
[](started(contract.approve(spender, value), spender != address(0)) ==>
   <>(finished(contract.approve(spender, value), return == true)))
```

erc20-approve-correct-amount

approve Updates the Approval Mapping Correctly. All non-reverting calls of the form approve(spender, amount) that return true must correctly update the allowance mapping according to the address msg.sender and the values of spender and amount. Specification:

_allowances[msg.sender][spender] == value)))

erc20-approve-change-state

approve Has No Unexpected State Changes. All calls of the form approve(spender, amount) must only update the allowance mapping according to the address msg.sender and the values of spender and amount and incur no other state changes. Specification:

```
[](willSucceed(contract.approve(spender, value), spender != address(0) && (p1 !=
    msg.sender || p2 != spender)) ==> <>(finished(contract.approve(spender,
    value), return == true ==> _totalSupply == old(_totalSupply) && _balances
    == old(_balances) && _allowances[p1][p2] == old(_allowances[p1][p2]) &&
    other_state_variables == old(other_state_variables))))
```

erc20-approve-false

If approve Returns false, the Contract's State Is Unchanged. If function approve returns false to signal a failure, it must undo all state changes that it incurred before returning to the caller. Specification:

```
[](willSucceed(contract.approve(spender, value)) ==>
    <>(finished(contract.approve(spender, value), return == false ==> (_balances ==
        old(_balances) && _totalSupply == old(_totalSupply) && _allowances ==
        old(_allowances) && other_state_variables == old(other_state_variables)))))
```

erc20-approve-never-return-false

approve Never Returns false . The function approve must never returns false . Specification:

[](!(finished(contract.approve, return == false)))

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